🔗 Share this article

During the first week of December, the U.S. President hosted the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. He promised an end to years of warfare in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Weeks later, however, a sharply contrasting strategy for instability emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, striking sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President warned, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Change of Direction

This contrast highlights the core principle of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on commerce and stopping hostilities—even as this fits with the new air campaign in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a top U.S. diplomat during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House spokesperson stated this, saying the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Mixed Signals

This change is consequential, but experts note it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is intertwined with the President’s personal style, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study estimates this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

International Apathy and Friction

Differing from his predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major disagreement has developed with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Engagement and Conditional Intervention

A similar confrontation emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the harsh rhetoric may have prompted the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

An Echo of Rivals

Some analysts see the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the new approach likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” she added.